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Statistical problems were at the origin of the mathematical theory of evidence, or Dempster–Shafer theory. It was also
one of the major concerns of Philippe Smets, starting with his PhD dissertation. This subject is reconsidered here, starting
with functional models, describing how data is generated in statistical experiments. Inference is based on these models,
using probabilistic assumption-based reasoning. It results in posterior belief functions on the unknown parameters. For-
mally, the information used in the process of inference can be represented by hints. Basic operations on hints are combi-
nation, corresponding to Dempster’s rule, and focussing. This leads to an algebra of hints. Applied to functional models,
this introduces an algebraic ﬂavor into statistical inference. It emphasizes the view that in statistical inference diﬀerent
pieces of information have to be combined and then focussed onto the question of interest. This theory covers Bayesian
and Fisher type inference as two extreme cases of a more general theory of inference.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Statistical problems were at the origin of the mathematical theory of evidence, or Dempster–Shafer theory.
One motivation was the attempt to better understand Fisher’s ﬁducial probabilities, namely to reason prob-
abilistically from sample data to posterior distributions without the need of prior distributions as in Bayesian
statistics [1–4]. Arthur Dempster introduced multivalued mappings from a probability space into a parameter
space, which then induced lower and upper probabilities. Later Shafer [5,6] gave these probability bounds a
more epistemic ﬂavor and interpreted them as belief and plausibility functions. But he too was interested in
using belief functions in statistical inference [7,8]. Philippe Smets also was always interested in belief functions
and statistical inference. His thesis [9] already addressed this problem and he remained fascinated with statistics0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2007.05.003
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sabbatical leave and later during the many vacations he spent in Schwarzsee, near Fribourg, Switzerland. A
regular topic in these discussions was the intriguing question of modelling multinomial problems, a subject
already studied by Dempster [1,4]. Of course Philippe always based his research on transferable belief func-
tions and the corresponding epistemic approach, avoiding probabilities. His views on the diﬀerent interpreta-
tions of belief functions can be found in [10,11]. In this paper, an alternative approach based on probability
and corresponding support functions is presented. The diﬀerence between the two approaches is more in phi-
losophy than in mathematical structure because, as mathematical objects, belief functions and support func-
tions are the same, namely Choquet capacities monotone to the order 1, regardless of the semantics
associated with them. However, one important point to stress is that, in our philosophy of assumption-based
reasoning, belief functions are derived from more basic structures and are not primitive objects as in Shafer’s
and Smets’ epistemic approaches.
The starting point in this paper is a model describing the ‘‘physical mechanism’’ generating the data in a
statistical experiment. This mechanism is called a functional model. It describes how a parameter and a sto-
chastic element generate an observation, a sample. The problem considered is then, given the functional model
and a sample, to infer about the unknown parameter of the model. The approach proposed is probabilistic
assumption-based reasoning. It goes back to [12] which noted that, in the setting of propositional logic, belief
functions can be derived by combining assumption-based reasoning, a well-known technique of Artiﬁcial
Intelligence, with probabilities. In this context, degrees of belief for propositions come up as probabilities
of environments allowing us to deduce the propositions. This coincides with an interpretation of belief func-
tion given in [13]. Probabilistic assumption-based reasoning has been developed into a theory of probabilistic
argumentation systems [14,15]. More recently, it has been further extended to a very general theory of uncertain
information [16,17]. The application of this theory to statistical inference is new. It looks at inference problems
in a way that is quite diﬀerent from classical statistics for parameter estimation. Like Bayesian statistics, it
aims at probabilistic statements about the unknown parameter. These statements are expressed in terms of
support and plausibility functions about the parameter. Unlike Bayesian statistics, but as in Fisher type sta-
tistics, the inference does not need prior information about the unknown parameter. However, the method
easily integrates prior information (in the form of belief functions) and therefore covers both Bayesian and
Fisher type approaches as two extreme cases.
In Sections 2 and 3 functional models and assumption-based reasoning are introduced. It is shown that they
lead to a mathematical object, which is called a hint. Hints are introduced and discussed in depth in [14]. Math-
ematically, they essentially represent Dempster’s systems of multivalued mappings. However, as explained in
Section 4, there is a diﬀerence in the way numerical quantities associated with these structures are interpreted.
Sections 4 and 5 contain a short introduction to the theory of hints and how they are used to evaluate hypoth-
eses. When a statistical experiment is performed, both its description as a mathematical model as well as the
data it produces represent pieces of information. In statistics and in other ﬁelds of science, information often
comes from diﬀerent sources, from the repetition of an experiment or from diﬀerent kinds of experiments. In
addition, external information about the parameter might be available, either prior or posterior information.
Information can also be focussed on certain aspects of particular interest. These elements can be seen as form-
ing an algebra of information [16], which in our case is represented by an algebra of hints. Sections 6–8 are
devoted to the development of these algebraic structures. Finally, in Section 9, this algebraic theory is applied
to functional models. This perspective introduces an algebraic ﬂavor into statistical inference. In particular, in
Section 10, it is shown that in our theory combining prior information with sample results from statistical
experiments is an important and natural algebraic operation. This generalizes Bayesian analysis and Bayes
theorem, another favorite subject of Philippe Smets [18]. Note that it has been shown that Bayesian networks
can be treated using the method of probabilistic assumption-based reasoning [19].
The theory presented in this paper reﬂects the intuitive idea that inference results should somehow be
obtained by combining all of the available pieces of information: the data, the model and possibly external
information. It is formally and mathematically shown that this can be achieved by a natural and logical com-
bination process, namely Dempster’s rule of combination for hints.
With the exception of an example, only discrete, ﬁnite models are considered in this paper in order to avoid
technical problems. However, continuous models are, at least in applications, as important as discrete models.
380 J. Kohlas, P.-A. Monney / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 378–398Extending belief functions to continuous frames was another important problem for Philippe Smets [20]. In
the context of functional models, this extension is a natural generalization, albeit introducing additional tech-
nical diﬃculties. The methods discussed in [21], although developed for a diﬀerent approach, are nevertheless
also useful for probabilistic assumption-based reasoning. We refer to [22] for a ﬁrst discussion of continuous
models. Smets’ approach to binomial and multinomial inference using belief functions is presented in [23]. An
alternative approach to these problems is given by Denoeux [24].
2. Functional models
Functional models describe the process by which a data x is generated from a parameter h and some
random element x. The set of possible values, i.e. the domain, of the data x is denoted by X, whereas the
domain of the parameter h is denoted by H and the domain of the random element x is denoted by X. Unless
otherwise speciﬁed, we assume that the sets X, H and X are ﬁnite. The data generation process is speciﬁed by a
functionf : H X! X ; ð1Þ
that relates the data with the perturbation and the parameter. In other words, if h 2 H is the correct value of
the parameter and the random element x 2 X occurs, then the data x is uniquely determined by the function f
according to the equationx ¼ f ðh;xÞ: ð2Þ
We assume that the function f is known and we also assume that the probability distribution of the random
element x is known. This probability distribution is denoted by p(x) and the corresponding probability mea-
sure on X is denoted by P. Note that the probability measure P does not depend on h. The function f together
with the probability measure P constitute a functional model for a statistical experiment E. It is not always easy
or even possible to formulate a functional model that accurately describes the ‘‘physics’’ of the data generation
mechanism, but there are certainly situations where this can be done.
Functional models have also been considered in [14,25], but they are reviewed in this paper because they are
central to the theory presented in later sections, which is new, and to keep the paper as much self-contained as
possible.
In a functional model, if we assume a parameter h, then, from the probabilities p(x), we can compute the
probabilities for the data x, namelyphðxÞ ¼
X
x:x¼f ðh;xÞ
pðxÞ:This shows that a functional model induces a parametric family of probability distributions on the sample
space X, an object which is usually assumed a priori in modelling statistical experiments. These probability
measures are the statistical speciﬁcations associated with functional model. As shown in [25], we emphasize
that diﬀerent functional models may induce the same statistical speciﬁcations ph(x). This means that functional
models contain more information than the family of distributions ph(x).
Example 1. Consider a fair coin with faces designated by 1 and 2. Suppose that there are only two possible
cases: either face 1 carries heads and face 2 carries tails, which is a case designated by the parameter h0, or both
faces carry heads, which is a case designated by the parameter h1. Therefore, the parameter space isH ¼ fh0; h1g:
The observed outcome x of the experiment E consisting in throwing the coin once is either heads or tails,
which means thatX ¼ fheads; tailsg:
Lastly, the chance element x is simply whether face 1 or face 2 turns up, so that we haveX ¼ f1; 2g;
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since the coin is fair. The functional model is then completely deﬁned by the speciﬁcation of the function f,
which is given byf ðh;xÞ ¼
heads if h ¼ h0 and x ¼ 1;
heads if h ¼ h1;
tails if h ¼ h0 and x ¼ 2:
8<
:It can easily be veriﬁed that this functional model induces the statistical speciﬁcationsph0ðheadsÞ ¼ 0:5; ph0ðtailsÞ ¼ 0:5;
ph1ðheadsÞ ¼ 1:0; ph1ðtailsÞ ¼ 0:Example 2. Suppose an urn contains N balls numbered from 1 to N. The ﬁrst h balls are white and the rest is
black, with 0 6 h 6 N. The experiment E consists in drawing one ball from the urn and observing its color. In
this experiment, h is the unknown parameter and its domain isH ¼ f0; 1; . . . ;Ng:
The random element is the number of the ball drawn and its domain isX ¼ f1; 2; . . . ;Ng:
We assume that p(x) = 1/N for all x and obviously we haveX ¼ fblack;whiteg:
The functional model is then completely speciﬁed by the function f given byf ðh;xÞ ¼ white if x 6 h;
black if x > h:
The corresponding statistical speciﬁcations arephðwhiteÞ ¼
h
N
; phðblackÞ ¼ 1
h
N
:Even though this urn model seems to be reasonable for sampling in the binary case, it is interesting to note that
it does not easily generalize to the multinomial case. This is an intriguing problem of functional modelling of
random sampling, as well as a general problem of modelling of random sampling with belief functions.3. Assumption-based reasoning
Consider an experiment E represented by a functional model x = f(h,x) with given probabilities p(x) for
the random elements. Suppose that the outcome of the experiment is observed to be x. Given this data x
and the experiment E, what can be inferred about the value of the unknown parameter h? To answer this ques-
tion, we use the principles of assumption-based reasoning. The basic idea of assumption-based reasoning is to
assume that a random element x generated the data and then determine the consequences of this assumption
on parameter. The consequences about h are then evaluated according to the probabilities p(x) of the assump-
tions x in X.
Some random elements x in X may become impossible after x has been observed. In fact, if, for an x 2 X,
there is no h 2 H such that x = f(h,x), then this x is clearly impossible: it cannot have generated the actual
observation x. Therefore, the observation x induces an event in X, namely the eventvx ¼ fx 2 X : there is a h 2 H such that x ¼ f ðh;xÞg: ð3Þ
Since it is known that vx has occurred, we need to condition the probability measure P on the event vx, which
leads to the revised probabilities
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p0ðxÞ;for all subsets A  vx. It is still unknown which random element x in vx generated the observation x, but p 0(x)
is the probability that this element is x. Nevertheless, let us assume for the time being that x caused the obser-
vation x. Then, according to the function f relating the parameter and the random element with the data, the
possible values for the parameter h can be logically restricted to the setT xðxÞ ¼ fh 2 H : x ¼ f ðh;xÞg: ð4Þ
Note that in general Tx(x) may contain several elements, but it could also be a one-element subset of H. It is
also possible that Tx(x) = H, in which case the observation x does not carry any information about h, assum-
ing that x caused the observations x. Therefore, in general, even if the chance element generating the obser-
vation x was known, it would still not be possible to identify the value of the parameter unambiguously. This
analysis shows that an observation x in a functional model generates the structureHx ¼ ðvx; P 0; T x;HÞ; ð5Þ
which we call a hint.
4. Introduction to the theory of hints
The hint deﬁned in (5) is an instance of a more general notion of a hint. In general, if H denotes the set of
possible answers to a question of interest, then a hint on H is a quadruple of the formH ¼ ðX; P ;C;HÞ; ð6Þ
where X is a set of assumptions, P is a probability measure on X reﬂecting the probability of the diﬀerent
assumptions and C is a mapping between the assumptions and the power set of H,C : X! 2H:
For an assumption x 2 X, the subset C(x) is the smallest subset of H that is known for sure to contain the
correct answer to the question of interest. In other words, if the assumption x is correct, then the answer
in certainly within C(x). The theory of hints is largely presented in Ref. [14] and we provide an introduction
to this theory to keep the paper as much self-contained as possible. Intuitively, a hint represents a piece of
information regarding the correct value in H. This information can then be used to evaluate the validity of
certain hypotheses regarding H. A hypothesis is a subset H of H and it is true if, and only if, it contains
the correct answer to the question of interest.
The most important concept for the evaluation of the hypothesis H is the degree of support of H, which is
deﬁned byspðHÞ ¼ P ðfx 2 X : CðxÞ  HgÞ: ð7Þ
If the assumption x is correct and C(x)  H, then H is necessarily true because the correct answer is in C(x)
by deﬁnition of the mapping C. The degree of support ofH is the probability of the assumptions that are capa-
ble of proving H. Such assumptions are called arguments for the validity of H and sp(H) measures the strength
of these arguments. The arguments represent the logical evaluation of H, whereas sp(H) represents the quan-
titative evaluation of H.
Similarly, the degree of plausibility of H, which is deﬁned asplðHÞ ¼ P ðfx 2 X : CðxÞ \ H 6¼ ;gÞ; ð8Þ
measures the level of compatibility between the hypothesis H and the assumptions. Obviously, degrees of sup-
port and plausibility for hypotheses lead to the functions
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which are called the support and plausibility functions associated with the hint. It can easily be shown thatplðHÞ ¼ 1 spðHcÞ;
and sp is a belief function in the sense of Shafer [6].
Note that Arthur Dempster introduced a structure like the one described in (6) in his early papers [1–4].
Within the framework of Ref. [2], the degree of support sp(H) would be denoted by P*(H) and would be called
the lower probability of H, whereas the degree of plausibility pl(H) would be called the upper probability of H
and would be denoted by P*(H). In this reference, it is mentioned that one may naturally regard the upper
probability P*(H) to be the largest possible amount of probability from the measure P which can be trans-
ferred to outcomes h 2 H and, similarly, the lower probability P*(H) represents the minimal amount of prob-
ability which can be transferred to outcomes h 2 H. However, it is worthwhile to point out that the upper and
lower probabilities do not serve as bounds for some unknown true probability of H, as no such probability is
assumed to exist. In the theory of hints, we look at sp(H) from a diﬀerent perspective, namely the one put
forward by Pearl under the name ‘‘probability of provability’’ [13], which is related to the classical AI para-
digm called truth-maintenance systems [12,26–28]. These systems contain a symbolic mechanism for identify-
ing the set of assumptions needed to create a proof of a hypothesis H and, when probabilities are assigned to
the assumptions, support and plausibility functions are obtained. In the theory of hints, these assumptions
form an argument for the hypothesis H and their probability measures the weight that is assigned to the argu-
ment. This perspective creates a mechanism for evaluating a hypothesis in terms of its weighted arguments,
thereby allowing us to interpret sp(H) as the weight of the arguments supporting H.
When there are several hints relative to the same domain H, the question is how should we combine these
hints in order to obtain a single hint reﬂecting the information contained in both hints? For the sake of sim-
plicity, we only consider the case where two hints are combined – the generalization to more than two hints is
straightforward. So letH1 ¼ ðX1; P 1;C1;HÞ; H2 ¼ ðX2; P 2;C2;HÞ; ð9Þ
be two hints on H. If the assumptions of the two hints are independent, then the prior probability of a pair of
assumptions (x1,x2) in X1 · X2 is P1(x) Æ P2(x)2. If the intersection C1(x1) \ C2(x2) is empty, then this pair is
called contradictory because, by construction of the mappings C1 and C2, it is impossible that both x1 and x2
are correct. Therefore, ifC ¼ fðx1;x2Þ 2 X1  X2 : C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þ ¼ ;g;
denotes the set of contradictory pairs of assumptions, then the correct pair must be in the setX ¼ ðX1  X2Þ  C: ð10Þ
Since the correct pair of assumptions is in X, we must condition the product probability measure P1P2 on the
set X. Speciﬁcally, if we deﬁneK ¼
X
fP 1ðx1ÞP 2ðx2Þ : ðx1;x2Þ 2 Cg;then the conditioning operation results in a new probability space (X,P) whereP ðx1;x2Þ ¼ P 1ðx1ÞP 2ðx2Þ
1 K ; ð11Þfor all (x1,x2) 2 X. Furthermore, if (x1,x2) is the correct pair of assumption, then the correct value in H must
necessarily be in the setCðx1;x2Þ ¼ C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þ: ð12Þ
This is the smallest subset of H that is know for sure to contain the correct answer if both x1 and x2 are as-
sumed to be correct. Therefore, we deﬁne the combination of the two hints H1 and H2 as the hintH1 H2 ¼ ðX; P ;C;HÞ;
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corresponds to Dempster’s rule for combining belief functions.
There is another notion regarding hints that we need to introduce, namely the operation of marginalization
of a hint. Consider a hint on a domain that is the Cartesian product of two domains, namely a hint of the formH ¼ ðX; P ;C;H1 H2Þ:
In order to evaluate hypotheses regarding the domain H1, we deﬁne the marginalization ofH to H1 as the hintH#H1 ¼ ðX; P ;C1;H1Þ;
whereC1ðxÞ ¼ fh1 2 H1 : 9 h2 2 H2 such that ðh1; h2Þ 2 CðxÞg:
The set C1(x) is the projection of C(x) to the domain H1. The deﬁnition of the mapping C1 is justiﬁed by the
fact that the projection C1(x) is the smallest subset of H1 that is known for sure to contain the correct value in
H1 when we know for sure that the correct joint value is in C(x). The marginalized hintH
#H1 can then be used
as usual to evaluate hypotheses H that are subsets of H1.
5. Evaluating hypotheses about the parameter
Consider again a functional model (f,P) and an observed data x. As shown in Section 2, the information on
the correct value of the parameter h that can be derived from the data x is given by the hintHx ¼ ðvx; P 0; T x;HÞ;
that is deﬁned in Eq. (5). Any hypothesis H  H regarding the correct value of the parameter can then be eval-
uated with respect to this hint. The arguments for the validity of H are the chance elements in the setuxðHÞ ¼ fx 2 vx : T xðxÞ  Hg;
and the degree of support of H isspðHÞ ¼ P 0ðuxðHÞÞ:
Similarly, the chance elements that are compatible with the hypothesis H are those in the setvxðHÞ ¼ fx 2 X : T xðxÞ \ H 6¼ ;g;
and the degree of plausibility of the hypothesis H isplðHÞ ¼ P 0ðvxðHÞÞ:Example 3. Let us consider the simple coin model presented in Example 1. If we assume that x = heads has
been observed, then both random elements remain possible, i.e. vheads = {1,2}. If we assume that face 1 turned
up, i.e. x = 1, thenT headsð1Þ ¼ fh0; h1g:
In other words, under this assumption, the experiment does not produce any information regarding the type of
coin. If we assume that face 2 turned up, i.e. x = 2, thenT headsð2Þ ¼ fh1g;
and we must necessarily conclude that the coin carries heads on both sides. Therefore, we getspheadsðh1Þ ¼ 0:5; spheadsðh0Þ ¼ 0:
This shows that the observation x = heads does not provide any support for the hypothesis h0, but this
hypothesis remains somewhat plausible becauseplheadsðh0Þ ¼ 1 spheadsðh1Þ ¼ 0:5:
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If we observe x = tails, then we must conclude that face 2 turned up and therefore vtails = {2}. Then we have
Ttails(2) = {h0} and sosptailsðh0Þ ¼ pltailsðh0Þ ¼ 1;
sptailsðh1Þ ¼ pltailsðh1Þ ¼ 0;which shows that the coin must carry both heads and tails.
Example 4. Let us consider the urn model described in Example 2, but with the modiﬁcation that the popu-
lations are inﬁnite. More precisely, for X, H and X we take the unit interval [0,1] and we consider that the
random element x in [0,1] is chosen according to a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The functional model isf ðh;xÞ ¼ white if x 6 h;
black otherwise:
This model represents the limiting case of the ﬁnite urn model of Example 2 when N is very large. Suppose that
a ball is drawn from the urn and this ball is white, i.e. x = white. Since all random elements remain possible
when white is observed, we have vwhite = [0,1]. If we assume that the chance element x generated the obser-
vation x, then h must belong toT whiteðxÞ ¼ fh : hP xg:
This means that the information on h that is derived from observing a white ball is given by the hintHwhite ¼ ð½0; 1;U ; T white; ½0; 1Þ;
where U denotes the uniform distribution on [0,1]. If H denotes the hypothesis that h is greater than a ﬁxed
value r, i.e.H ¼ fh 2 ½0; 1 : hP rg;
then we haveuwhiteðHÞ ¼ fx 2 ½0; 1 : xP rg;
and thereforespðHÞ ¼ UðuwhiteðHÞÞ ¼ 1 r:
The degree of support and plausibility of any hypothesis H can be easily computed and the case where
x = black is observed can be analyzed in a similar way.
Example 5. Let us now consider the case where the urn experiment described in the previous Example 4 is
repeated n times, i.e. n balls are drawn with replacement from the urn. Let x = (x1, . . .,xn) denote the corre-
sponding random element and let c = (c1, . . .,cn) denote the vector of colors of the balls drawn. For
i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, if we deﬁnefiðh;xiÞ ¼
white if xi 6 h;
black otherwise;
then the functional model corresponding to the n independent draws from the urn isðf1ðh;x1Þ; . . . ; fnðh;xnÞÞ ¼ ðc1; . . . ; cnÞ;
and the random vector x = (x1, . . .,xn) is chosen according to the uniform distribution over the unit cube
[0,1]n.
Now suppose that a particular vector of colors (c1, . . .,cn) has been observed. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that the ﬁrst x components of this vector are white and the remaining n  x components are
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: ð13ÞIn order to condition on the event vx, we must ﬁrst compute the probability of vx. To do so, we introduce the
new random variablesY x ¼ max
i¼1;...;x
xi; Znx ¼ min
j¼xþ1;...;n
xj:The cumulative distribution function of each of these random variables isP ðY x 6 tÞ ¼ tx; t 2 ½0; 1; P ðZnx > sÞ ¼ ð1 sÞnx; s 2 ½0; 1;
and their respective density functions are xtx1 and (n  x)(1  s)nx1. The set vx is expressed by the condi-
tion Yx < Znx and its probability isP ðvxÞ ¼ P ðY x < ZnxÞ ¼
Z 1
0
xtx1ð1 tÞnx dt ¼ xCðxÞCðn xþ 1Þ





For a ﬁxed x 2 vx, we can conclude that Tx(x) = {Yx 6 h < Znx}. It is then easy to compute the degree of
support and plausibility of any hypothesis of interest. For example, for a hypothesis of the form H = [a,b]
where a and b satisfy 0 6 a < b 6 1, if P 0 denotes the conditional probability given vx, we obtainspxða 6 h 6 bÞ ¼ P 0ðT xðxÞ  ½a; bÞÞ ¼
R b
a xt






CðxÞCðn xþ 1Þ t
x1ð1 tÞnx dt  n
x
 
ðbx  axÞð1 bÞnx:The integrand of the last integral is the density of the beta distribution with parameters x and n  x + 1. If








hxð1 hÞnx:These plausibilities are proportional to the likelihood function associated with the experiment. Models that are
similar to this urn model have been treated in [1,4].
These examples illustrate the fact that the uncertainty about the parameter is not always expressed as a
probability measure as is sometimes suggested in ﬁducial probability theory. Nevertheless, hypotheses can still
be evaluated in terms of degrees of support and degrees of plausibility and these quantities both have a clear
meaning: the degree of support is the probability that the hypothesis can be logically deduced from the model
and the observed data, whereas the degree of plausibility is the probability that the hypothesis cannot be
refuted using the model and the data. These examples also demonstrate that the likelihood function, which
is actually the statistical speciﬁcations ph(x) considered as function of h when x is observed, does not contain
all of the information about the parameter that can be derived from the observation and the model because the
entire plausibility function cannot be uniquely recovered from the plausibility function restricted to singletons.
Therefore, it does not make much sense to normalize the likelihood function and use it as a probability
measure to evaluate compound hypotheses, as proposed for example in [29].
6. Representing functional models with hints
We have seen that the information about the parameter that can be derived from a functional model and an
observed data is represented by a hint, which can in turn be used to evaluate hypotheses in interest. But it is
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Therefore, not only the result of the inference can be expressed in terms of hints, but also the experiment that
is used to make the inference can be expressed with hints.
A functional model f(h,x) where P denotes the probability measure of the random elements x can be rep-
resented by the hintHf ¼ ðX; P ;Cf ;X HÞ; ð14Þ
whereCf ðxÞ ¼ fðx; hÞ 2 X H : x ¼ f ðh;xÞg: ð15Þ
An observation x can be represented by the hintOx ¼ ðfmg; P ;C;X HÞ;
where m is the assumption stating that x has been observed, which is true with probability P(m) = 1, andCðmÞ ¼ fxg H: ð16Þ
This equation is justiﬁed by the fact that no restriction can be imposed on H when the observed value x is the
only piece of information that is being considered. The hintsHf and Ox represent two pieces of information
that can be put together in order to determine the information on the parameter that can be derived from the
model and the data. The result of this pooling of information is the combined hintHf  Ox. This hint is de-
ﬁned on X · H and the information about the parameter is obtained by marginalizing it toH. It is then easy to
see that the result of this marginalization is the same as the hint Hx deﬁned in Eq. (5), which means thatHx ¼ ðHf  OxÞ#H: ð17Þ
Let us now consider the situation where several independent observations are obtained, as in Example 5. Spe-
ciﬁcally, suppose that the experiment is repeated n times and let Ei denote the experiment that is performed at
time i. This experiment is represented by the functional model fi(h, xi) where the random element xi is distrib-
uted according to the probability measure Pi on Xi. Since the experiments are repetitions of a same experiment,
it follows that all Xi are the same and equal to X, all Pi are the same and equal to P and all functions fi are the
same and equal to f. Furthermore, if Xi denotes the set of possible observations at time i, then all domains Xi
are the same and equal to X. If xi denotes the observation at time i, then, from the experiment Ei, we havefiðh;xiÞ ¼ xi;
and thereforeðf1ðh;x1Þ; . . . ; fnðh;xnÞÞ ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ: ð18Þ
If we deﬁne the functiong : H Xn ! Xn;
bygðh;x1; . . . ;xnÞ ¼ ðf1ðh;x1Þ; . . . ; fnðh;xnÞÞ;
and if we deﬁne x = (x1, . . .,xn) and x = (x1, . . .,xn), then Eq. (18) can be written asgðh;xÞ ¼ x:
This means that the repetition of the n independent experiments is represented by the functional model g(h,x)
where the random vector x is selected according to the product probability measureP ¼
Yn
i¼1
P i:Therefore, according to Eq. (17), the information on the parameter that can be derived from the repeated
experiments is given by the hintHx1;...;xn ¼ ðHg  Ox1;...;xnÞ#H: ð19Þ
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Ei is the hintHxi ¼ ðHfi  OxiÞ#H; ð20Þ
because fi(h,xi) and Pi represent the functional model associated with experiment Ei and xi is the observed
data at time i. Since the experiments are independent, these hints may be combined by Dempster’s rule and
we ﬁnally obtain the hintHx1     Hxn : ð21Þ
This shows that the information on the parameter that can be derived from the repeated experiment can be
regarded as being the hint given in (19) or the hint given in (21). The natural question is then whether or
not these two hints are the same, as one would expect. In other words, is it correct to writeHx1;...;xn ¼Hx1     Hxn : ð22Þ
The answer to this question is yes, which means that it does not matter which perspective is taken to make
inference with respect to several independent experiments. Even though it is possible to give a direct proof
of Eq. (22), we are going to proceed diﬀerently by developing a general algebraic theory for reasoning with
pieces of information and show that Eq. (22) is a simple application of this theory.
7. Focussing of hints and partitions
In this section, we present some notions related to partitions that will be useful in the development of the
algebraic theory of hints. Consider a general domain H representing the possible answers to a question of
interest. A partition P of H is a family of non-empty subsets of H which are mutually disjoint and cover
H, namely[
A2P
A ¼ H; A \ A0 ¼ ; for all A; A0 2 P satisfying A 6¼ A0:Now consider a hintH ¼ ðX; P ;C;HÞ;
on H and a partition P of H. This partition represents a coarser granularity for the possible answers to the
question of interest and we want to express the information contained in the hint with respect to this coarser
granularity. By construction, under the assumption x 2 X, it is known for sure that the correct answer to the
question is within the subset C(x). Then every element A of the partition P that intersects with C(x) might
contain the answer. Therefore, the setC!PðxÞ ¼ [fA 2 P : A \ CðxÞ 6¼ ;g;
is the smallest union of elements of P that necessarily contain the correct answer to the question. This shows
that the hint H is represented by the hintH!P ¼ ðX; P ;C!P;HÞ;
when the coarser domain P is used instead of the original domain H. This operation of coarsening the infor-
mation contained in the hintH is called focussing. The focussing operation has been introduced by Shafer [6].
We say that a hint H is carried by a partition P ifH!P ¼H:
SinceðH!PÞ!P ¼H!P;
it follows that the coarsened hint H!P is carried by the partition P.
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two partitions in D, then we say that P 6 P0 if, for all A 2 P, there is a A0 2 P0 such that A  A 0. In this case
we say that P is ﬁner than P0, or, alternatively, that P0 is coarser than P. This terminology is justiﬁed by the
fact that, for every A0 2 P0, we haveA0 ¼ [fA 2 P : A  A0g:The partition consisting of all one-element subsets of H is the bottom element of this partial order. We identify
H with this bottom partition, which allows us to consider thatH is inD. It can be shown that the pair ðD;6Þ is
actually a lattice with meet and join given byP ^P0 ¼ fA \ A0 : A 2 P;A0 2 P0g;
P _P0 ¼ ^fQ 2 D : QP P;QP P0g:Now consider three partitions P1, P2 and P in D. Then we say that P1 and P2 are conditionally independent
given P, if, for all P 1 2 P1, P 2 2 P2 and P 2 P, the condition Pi \ P5 ; for i = 1,2 implies P1 \ P2 \ P5 ;.
In this case we writeðP1;P2Þ a P:
Let us now consider a hintH ¼ ðX; P ;C;HÞ and deﬁne the partitionW of X that is obtained by grouping the
elements x in X that map to the same set C(x). If we deﬁne X0 ¼W and, for W 2W, if we deﬁne
C 0(W) = C(x) where x is any element of W, and if we deﬁneP 0ðW Þ ¼
X
x2W
P ðxÞ;then the hintHc ¼ ðX0; P 0;C0;HÞ
is called the canonical version ofH. Clearly, bothH and its canonical versionHc have the same support and
plausibility functions. A hint satisfying C(x)5 C(x 0) whenever x5 x 0 is its own canonical version and such
a hint is called canonical.
LetV denote the set of all canonical hints on H. In order to makeV closed under the operations of focus-
sing and combination, we slightly modify these operations by taking the canonical version of the resulting hint
at the end. In other words, we deﬁneH1 H2 ¼ ðH1 H2Þc
H!P ¼ ðH!PÞc:Furthermore, given two hints H1 ¼ ðX1; P 1;C1;HÞ andH2 ¼ ðX2; P 2;C2;HÞ, it can happen that
fðx1;x2Þ 2 X1  X2 : C1ðx1Þ \ C2ðx2Þ 6¼ ;g ¼ ;:In this case the two hints cannot be combined because they are completely contradictory. However, we nev-
ertheless formally deﬁne the combined hint as the zero hint Z, which is not further speciﬁed. In addition,
for every hint H and every partition P, we deﬁneHZ ¼ Z; Z!P ¼ Z;
and we consider that the set V also contains the zero hint Z.
8. An algebra of hints
The set V endowed with the operation of combination has some interesting algebraic properties, some of
which are related to the focussing operation. These properties, some of which are already mentioned in [14],
are presented in the following theorem.
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(1) Semigroup: The operation of combination is associative and commutative. There is a neutral hint E such that
H E ¼H for every H 2V. There is a null element Z such that HZ ¼Z for every H 2V.
(2) Transitivity: If H is carried by a partition P1 and ðP1;P2Þ a P, then
H!P2 ¼ ðH!PÞ!P2 :(3) Combination: IfH1 is carried by a partitionP1 andH2 is carried by a partitionP2 and ðP1;P2Þ a P, then
ðH1 H2Þ!P ¼H!P1 H!P2 :(4) Neutrality: For all P 2 D we have
E!P ¼ E:(5) Nullity: For all P 2 D we have
H!P ¼ Z()H ¼Z:(6) Focussing: For all H 2V we have
H!H ¼H:Proof. Assertions (1)–(3) are proved in [14]. Assertions (4)–(6) are immediate consequences of the deﬁnition of
focussing. h
Let us now consider the particular case where H is a Cartesian product, namelyH ¼ H1     Hn: ð23Þ
Then we deﬁne the setN ¼ f1; . . . ; ng;
and, for every subset J  N, we deﬁneHJ ¼
Y
j2J
Hj:Note that we clearly have H = HN and each HJ corresponds to a partition of H, namely the partitionPJ ¼ ffhJg HNJ : hJ 2 HJg:
It is shown in [14] that PJ 6 PK if and only if K  J andðPI ;PJ Þ a PK () I \ J  K:
If a partition PJ is simply denoted by J, then we obtain the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. The set V consisting of all canonical hints on the domain H given in (23) has the following
properties:
(1) Transitivity: Let H be a hint in V that is carried by I. If I \ J  K, then
H!J ¼ ðH!KÞ!J :(2) Combination: LetH1 be a hint inV that is carried by I and letH2 be a hint in V that is carried by J. If
I \ J  K, then
ðH1 H2Þ!K ¼H!K1 H!K2 :Note that the operation of marginalization deﬁned in Section 4 is a special case of the focussing operation.
The following theorem presents algebraic properties of hints with respect to the partitions PJ , which are again
simply denoted by J.
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(1) Semigroup: The operation of combination is associative and commutative. There is a neutral hint E such that
H E ¼H for every H 2V. There is a null element Z such that HZ ¼ Z for every H 2V.
(2) Transitivity: For all J, K M and all H 2V, we have
ðH!J Þ!K ¼H!J\K :(3) Combination: For all K M and all H1;H2 2V, we have
ðH!K1 H2Þ!K ¼H!K1 H!K2 :(4) Neutrality: For all J M, we have
E!J ¼ E:(5) Nullity: For all J M, we have
H!J ¼Z()H ¼ Z:(6) Focussing: For all H 2V, we have
H!M ¼H:Proof. Assertion (1) is the same as in Theorem 1 and assertions (4)–(6) are simple reformulations of assertions
(5)–(7) in Theorem 1.
In order to prove assertion (2), we ﬁrst show that, for J  K, we always have
H!J ¼ ðH!KÞ!J : ð24ÞAny hintH is carried by N according to property (6) of the present theorem and we have N \ J  K. There-
fore, (24) follows from property (1) of Corollary 1. Further, note that ðH!JÞ!J ¼H!J by property (1) of
Corollary 1, which means that H!J is carried by J. Then, by assertion (1) of Corollary 1, we haveðH!J Þ!K ¼ ððH!J Þ!J\KÞ!K :
Using (24) and assertion (1) of Corollary 1, we ﬁnally obtainðH!J Þ!K ¼ ðH!J\KÞ!K ¼H!J\K :
In order to prove assertion (3) we use again the fact that H!K1 is carried by K and J \ K  K. Therefore,
assuming that H2 is carried by J, assertion (2) of Corollary 1 implies thatðH!K1 H2Þ!K ¼ ðH!K1 Þ!K H!K2 ¼H!K1 H!K2 : 
An algebraic structure with two operations, namely combination and focussing, that satisﬁes the properties
of Theorem 2 is called a valuation algebra. This is an algebraic structure related to a similar one deﬁned orig-
inally in [30] as an abstraction of some important properties of probabilities [31].
Theorem 3. For all partitions J, K  N and all hints H1;H2 2V, we have
ðH!J1 H!K2 Þ!J\K ¼H!J\K1 H!J\K2 : ð25ÞProof. The hints H!J1 and H
!K
2 are carried by J and K, respectively. The second assertion of Corollary 1
implies thatðH!J1 H!K2 Þ!J\K ¼ ðH!J1 Þ!J\K  ðH!K2 Þ!J\K :
But then assertion (2) of Theorem 2 implies thatðH!J1 Þ!J\K ¼H!J\K1 ;
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which proves the theorem. h
Theorems 2 and 3 correspond to abstract algebraic results presented in [16], which contains a systematic
discussion of algebraic structures for uncertain information. Such structures can be exploited for computation,
as will be shown in the next section. The following result is some kind of generalization of Eq. (25) when more
than two hints are involved.
Theorem 4. Let M = {1, . . ., n} [ {t} where t is the index of a domain that is different from the domain Hi for
all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Furthermore, for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, let Ji = {i, t}. Then, for any hints H1; . . . ;Hn in the set V
consisting of all canonical hints on HM, we haveH!J11     H!Jnn
 !ftg ¼H!ftg1     H!ftgn : ð26ÞProof. We prove this result by induction over n. The result is correct when n = 2 according to Theorem 3.
Now suppose that it is correct for n  1. Then we haveðH!J11     H!Jnn Þ!ftg ¼ ðn1i¼1H!J ii H!Jnn Þ!ftg: ð27Þ
But n1i¼1H!J ii is carried by {1, . . .,n  1, t} andH!Jnn is carried by Jn = {n, t}. Then, by assertion (2) of Cor-
ollary 1, we haven1i¼1H!J ii H!Jnn
 !ftg ¼ n1i¼1H!J ii !ftg  H!Jnn !ftg: ð28ÞBy induction hypothesis we haveðn1i¼1H!J ii Þ!ftg ¼ n1i¼1H!ftgi ;
and by assertion (2) of Theorem 2 we can writeðH!Jnn Þ!ftg ¼H!ftgn :
Therefore, using Eqs. (27) and (28), we conclude that Eq. (26) is correct. h9. Application to functional models
In this section, we show that the information that can be deduced from repeated experiments modelled by
functional models can be viewed as the result of putting together every piece of information that is available.
Speciﬁcally, the hint on the parameter spaceH that can be derived from the data and the model is expressed as
the combination all available hints. This provides an algebraic ﬂavor to statistical inference, a perspective that
emphasizes the symmetric role played by the diﬀerent pieces of information that are relevant for the inference.
Since marginalization is a special case of focussing, Eq. (19) in Section 6 implies that the information about
the parameter that can be derived from the repeated experiments is given by the hintHx1;...;xn ¼ ðHg  Ox1;...;xnÞ!H;







P i;andCgðx1; . . . ;xnÞ ¼ fðx1; . . . ; xn; hÞ : ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ ¼ gðh;x1; . . . ;xnÞg: ð29Þ
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Eqs. (14) and (15). Then we haveHg ¼Hf1     Hfn : ð30ÞProof. SinceHfi is carried by Xi · H and X




fore we must show thatHg ¼H!XnHf1     H!X
nH
fn
: ð31ÞBut by deﬁnition, we haveH!X
nH
fi





ðxiÞ ¼ fðx1; . . . ; xn; hÞ : xi ¼ fiðh;xiÞg:Therefore, for (x1, . . .,xn) in X, by Eq. (29), we have\ni¼1C!X
nH
fi
ðxiÞ ¼ fðx1; . . . ; xn; hÞ : x1 ¼ f1ðh;x1Þ; . . . ; xn ¼ fnðh;xnÞg ¼ fðx1; . . . ; xn; hÞ : ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ
¼ gðh;x1; . . . ;xnÞg ¼ Cgðx1; . . . ;xnÞ:
But this clearly implies (31), which proves the theorem. h
The following theorem gives the same type of result with respect to the observed data.
Theorem 6. Let Ox1;...;xn denote the hint on X
n · H representing the vector of observations (x1, . . .,xn) and let Oxi
denote the hint on Xi · H representing the observation xi. Then we haveOx1;...;xn ¼ Ox1      Oxn : ð32ÞProof. The hint on the left-hand side of (32) contains a single assumption, which has probability 1, and its
corresponding restriction is (x1, . . .,xn) · H. Since Oxi is carried by Xi · H and X
n · H is a reﬁnement of
Xi · H, we have Oxi ¼ O!X
nH
xi
, which means that we have to prove thatOx1;...;xn ¼ O!X
nH
x1
     O!XnHxn : ð33ÞBut O!X
nH
xi
has a single assumption, which has probability 1, and its corresponding restriction isX 1      fxig      Xn H:
Therefore, the constraint associated with the single assumption of the hint on the right-hand side of (33) is\ni¼1ðX 1      fxig      Xn HÞ ¼ ðx1;    ; xnÞ H;
which is the same as the restriction of Ox1;...;xn . This shows that Eq. (32) is correct, which proves the
theorem. h
According to Eq. (19) in Section 6, the hint about the parameter that can be derived from the vector of data isHx1;...;xn ¼ ðHg  Ox1;...;xnÞ#H:
Since marginalization is a special case of focussing, then, by Theorems 5 and 6, we can writeHx1;...;xn ¼ ðHg  Ox1;...;xnÞ!H ¼ ni¼1Hfi
  ni¼1Oxi  !H;and thereforeHx1;...;xn ¼ ni¼1 Hfi  Oxi
  !H
: ð34Þ
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representing the available pieces of information. We are now in a position to prove Eq. (22) in Section 6.
Theorem 7. The information about the parameter that can be derived from repeated experiments modelled by a
functional model is given by the hintHx1;...;xn ¼Hx1     Hxn : ð35ÞProof. According to Eq. (34), we haveHx1;...;xn ¼ ni¼1ðHfi  OxiÞ
 !H
:Then, in Theorem 4, let M = {1, . . .,n} [ {t} where the index i 2M with 1 6 i 6 n represents the domain Xi
and the index t represents the domain H. Since both hintsHfi and Oxi are carried by Ji = {i, t}, the combined
hint Hfi  Oxi is also carried by Ji. Therefore, we can writeHfi  Oxi ¼ ðHfi  OxiÞ!J i ;
and henceHx1;...;xn ¼ ni¼1ðHfi  OxiÞ!J i
 !ftg
:Then, by Theorem 4, we conclude thatHx1;...;xn ¼ ni¼1ðHfi  OxiÞ!ftg:
Since marginalization is a special case of focussing, Eq. (20) implies thatHfi  Oxi
 !ftg ¼Hxi ;and hence Eq. (35) is correct, which proves the theorem. h10. External information
In this section, we consider again a functional model speciﬁed by a function f and we suppose that the data
x has been observed. Now assume that besides the model and the data another piece of information regarding
the parameter is available. This is an external piece of information that needs to be combined with those that
are already available, namely the hintHf representing the model and the hint Ox representing the observation.
Therefore, ifH0 denotes a hint on H representing this external information, then the information about the
parameter that can be derived from all the available pieces of information is given by the hintH ¼ Hf  Ox H0
 !H
:But then, by Theorem 3, we haveH ¼ Hf  Ox
 !H H0and hence, by Eq. (17) in Section 6, we can writeH ¼Hx H0; ð36Þ
where the hintHx deﬁned in Eq. (5) in Section 3 represents the information about the parameter that is de-
rived from the model and the data. Eq. (36) shows that we easily include external information about the
parameter when such information is available.
Let us now consider the special case where the hintH0 represents a prior probability distribution p0 on H.
In other words, we haveH0 ¼ ðH; p0; id;HÞ; ð37Þ
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which means that the restriction C(x) associated with every random element x is a singleton. For precise hints,
the support and plausibility functions coincide are probability measures. In the case of the hint (37), this prob-
ability measure is given by the probability distribution p0. Note that for precise hints, the plausibility function
restricted to singletons completely speciﬁes the plausibility function becauseplðHÞ ¼
X
h2H
plðhÞ;for all H  H. Therefore, if we know that a hint is precise, then we only need to determine its plausibility of
singletons function in order to be able to compute the degree of support and the degree of plausibility of any
hypothesis H  H. Now, if we take the precise hintH0 given in Eq. (37), then Theorem 4.8 in [14] implies that
the hintH ¼Hx H0;
is precise and its plausibility of singletons function is given byplðhÞ ¼ p0ðhÞplxðhÞP
h2H
p0ðhÞplxðhÞ
; ð38Þwhere plx is the plausibility function associated with the hintHx. This is an interesting formula showing how
we can compute the plausibility of any parameter value. However, we can go even one step further by using
the following theorem, which explains how the plausibility of singletons function ofHx is related to the sta-
tistical speciﬁcations ph(x) associated with the functional model. This result is mentioned in Eq. (9.18) of [14].
Theorem 8. Let plx denote the plausibility function of the hintHx. Then there is a positive constant k such thatplxðhÞ ¼ k  phðxÞ; ð39Þ
for all h 2 H.
Proof. By deﬁnition of Hx, we can writeplxðhÞ ¼ P 0ðfx 2 vx : T xðxÞ \ fhg 6¼ ;gÞ ¼ P 0ðfx 2 vx : h 2 T xðxÞgÞ ¼ P 0ðfx 2 vx : x ¼ f ðh;xÞgÞ:
But then, sincefx 2 vx : x ¼ f ðh;xÞg ¼ fx 2 X : x ¼ f ðh;xÞg;
when x and h are ﬁxed, if we deﬁnek ¼ 1
P ðvxÞ ;then we haveplxðhÞ ¼ k  Pðfx 2 X : x ¼ f ðh;xÞgÞ ¼ k  phðxÞ;
which proves Eq. (39). h
This theorem implies that Eq. (38) can be written asplðhÞ ¼ p0ðhÞphðxÞP
h2H
p0ðhÞphðxÞ
; ð40Þwhich is exactly the classical Bayes theorem. However, as usual, we interpret pl(h) as a probability of provabil-
ity and do not consider the parameter as being a random variable. This analysis shows that the inference pro-
cedure proposed in this paper reproduces Bayesian inference as a particular case. It is interesting to note that
Eq. (40) shows that we don’t need the entire functional model in the Bayesian setting, only the statistical spec-
iﬁcations ph(x) are needed. However, we emphasize that the Bayesian setting is only a very particular case.
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H0 is absent and the inference result is simplyHx. Another situation is when we have one or more external
hints regarding the parameter. These hints can be combined withHx without any problem. So the framework
proposed in this paper is much more general than the Bayesian setting and Eq. (36) can be regarded as a gen-
eralization of the classical Bayes theorem.
In a Bayesian setting, ignorance is often represented by a uniform probability distribution on H. In this
case, according to Eq. (40), the plausibility of singletons function becomesplðhÞ ¼ phðxÞP
h2H
phðxÞ
; ð41Þwhich is simply the normalization of the likelihood function. In the theory of hints, ignorance is represented by
the vacuous hintN, which has only one random element having a probability one and whose restriction is the
entire domain H. In this case, formula (36) becomesH ¼Hx N ¼Hx;
because the vacuous hint is the neutral element with respect to the combination operation. As shown in Sec-
tion 5, it can happen that the hintHx is not precise, unlike the hintH that is obtained when a uniform prob-
ability distribution is assumed on H. This means that assuming a uniform probability distribution on H or
assuming a vacuous hint on H do not in general produce the same inference results. Therefore, in general, uni-
form priors do not properly describe total ignorance and they do not produce the correct results. An exception
to this is when the functional model of the experiment is invertible. We refer to [32,33] for a discussion of this
kind of functional models.
11. Conclusion
Probabilistic assumptions-based reasoning is a natural way to conduct statistical inference. It leads to pos-
terior probabilistic statements about the unknown value of the parameter of interest, provided that a func-
tional model describing the experiment is available. In this sense it is like Bayesian inference, but it needs
no prior probability distribution. However, prior information can be easily introduced in a natural way. Fur-
thermore, the prior need not be a probability distribution: any belief function or hint representing external
prior information about the parameter can be used. Also, external information does not have to be considered
as being available prior to the experiment, it can very well be incorporated a posteriori, after the experiment
has been conducted. Diﬀerent experiments regarding the same or related parameters can be easily combined.
These characteristics give an interesting algebraic ﬂavor to statistical inference theory.
This is a ﬁrst step toward the development of models for more signiﬁcant statistical problems. In this paper
only simple discrete examples have been provided to illustrate the approach. Conceivably, the method will be
best suited in situations where there is a clear mechanism generating the data, i.e. situations where a functional
model can be clearly identiﬁed. Interestingly, classical linear models, including regression analysis, can be well
captured by this method. Indeed, the regression modely ¼ Xbþ ;
can be regarded as a functional model because the data y is a linear function of the parameter b and the per-
turbation . More details about the analysis of these models from a functional model perspective can be found
in [25].
In these models, it leads to the same results as the well-known classical statistical approaches, but it is more
general and it gives a diﬀerent interpretation to the inference results. For example, in the case of linear models,
assumption-based inference can treat the case of under-determined systems just as well as the usually consid-
ered case of over-determined systems [25]. More diﬃcult and intriguing is the modelling of random sampling,
for instance the case of multinomial problems. The solution to this puzzle seems to be hidden in barycentric
coordinates of multidimensional simplexes, as proposed by Dempster in his fundamental papers [1,4]. This
conclusion has also been reached by Philippe Smets in his own way.
J. Kohlas, P.-A. Monney / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 48 (2008) 378–398 397Other issues concern the asymptotic analysis of the inference based on functional models. As shown in this
paper, this kind of inference leads to belief functions on the parameter space. But, conceivably, in the limiting
case of large samples, these belief functions will collapse to ordinary probability distributions, which would be
the same as the asymptotic results obtained with classical ﬁducial or Bayesian inference. However, nothing has
yet been done in this area of research. Another missing piece is how to arrive at decisions based on assump-
tion-based inference, primarily in the context of testing statistical hypotheses. In the ﬁrst place this concerns
testing hypotheses. In Neyman–Pearson test theory, a hypothesis is rejected or accepted based on the sample.
In the present approach, a hypothesis is accepted if its degree of support is suﬃciently large, and it is rejected if
its degree of plausibility is suﬃciently small. When none of the conditions is satisﬁed, it should be concluded
that there is not enough information to make a decision. Contrary to Neyman–Pearson test theory, which is
based on operational characteristics, i.e. average performance criteria over all possible samples, the assump-
tion-based approach is based on the individual sample that is observed, just as in the Bayesian approach.
Therefore, unlike Neyman–Pearson’s test theory, which stresses the seller’s point of view (of the statistician
proposing the test), the assumption-based reasoning approach stresses the user’s point of view because the risks
are not evaluated in the average, but for the given sample. Very little is known on this way to make decisions
and how it is related to Neyman–Pearson theory and to the theory of conﬁdence intervals and to the theory of
parameter estimation in general. Even though statistical inference was at the origin of evidence theory, it has
been somewhat neglected afterwards. Maybe it is time to come back to it.Acknowledgements
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